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Epistemic planning can be used for decision making in multi-agent situations with distributed knowl-
edge and capabilities. Recently, Dynamic Epistemic Logic (DEL) has been shown to provide a very
natural and expressive framework for epistemic planning. We extend the DEL-based epistemic plan-
ning framework to include perspective shifts, allowing us to define new notions of sequential and
conditional planning with implicit coordination. With these, it is possible to solve planning tasks
with joint goals in a decentralized manner without the agents having to negotiate about and commit
to a joint policy at plan time. First we define the central planning notions and sketch the implemen-
tation of a planning system built on those notions. Afterwards we provide some case studies in order
to evaluate the planner empirically and to show that the concept is useful for multi-agent systems in
practice.
1 Introduction
One important task in Multi-Agent Systems is to collaboratively reach a joint goal with multiple au-
tonomous agents. The problem is particularly challenging in situations where the knowledge and capa-
bilities required to reach the goal are distributed among the agents. Most existing approaches therefore
apply some centralized coordinating instance from the outside, strictly separating the stages of commu-
nication and negotiation from the agents’ internal planning and reasoning processes. In contrast, building
upon the epistemic planning framework by Bolander and Andersen [8], we propose a decentralized plan-
ning notion in which each agent has to individually reason about the entire problem and autonomously
decide when and how to (inter-)act. For this, both reasoning about the other agents’ possible contribu-
tions and reasoning about their capabilities of performing the same reasoning is needed. We achieve our
notion of implicitly coordinated plans by requiring all desired communicative abilities to be modeled as
epistemic actions which then can be planned alongside their ontic counterparts, thus enabling the agents
to perform observations and coordinate at run time. It captures the intuition that communication clearly
constitutes an action by itself and, more subtly, that even a purely ontic action can play a communica-
tive role (e.g. indirectly suggesting follow-up actions to another agent). Thus, for many problems our
approach appears quite natural. On the practical side, the epistemic planning framework allows a very
expressive way of defining both the agents’ physical and communicative abilities.
Consider the following example scenario. Bob would like to borrow the apartment of his friend Anne
while she is away on vacation. Anne would be very happy to do him this favor. So they now have the
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joint goal of making sure that Bob can enter the apartment when he arrives. Anne will think about how
to achieve the goal, and might come up with the following plan: Anne puts the key under the door mat;
when Bob arrives, Bob takes the key from under the door mat; Bob opens the door with the key. Note
that the plan does not only contain the actions required by Anne herself, but also the actions of Bob.
These are the kind of multi-agent plans that this paper is about.
However, the plan just presented does not count as an implicitly coordinated plan. When Bob arrives
at the apartment, he will clearly not know that the key is under the door mat, unless Anne has told him,
and this announcement was not part of the plan just presented. If Anne has the ability to take Bob’s
perspective (she has a Theory of Mind concerning Bob [29]), Anne should of course be able to foresee
this problem, and realize that her plan can not be expected to be successful. An improved plan would then
be: Anne puts the key under the door mat; Anne calls Bob to let him know where the key is; when Bob
arrives, Bob takes the key from under the door mat; Bob opens the door with the key. This does qualify
as an implicitly coordinated plan. Anne now knows that Bob will know that he can find the key under the
door mat and hence will be able to reach the goal. Anne does not have to request or even coordinate the
sub-plan for Bob (which is: take key under door mat; open door with key), as she knows he will himself
be able to determine this sub-plan given the information she provides. This is an important aspect of
implicit coordination: coordination happens implicitly as a consequence of observing the actions of
others (including announcements), never explicitly through agreeing or committing to a specific plan.
The essential contributions of this paper are to formally define this notion of implicitly coordinated plans
as well as to document and benchmark an implemented epistemic planner that produces such plans.
Our work is situated in the area of distributed problem solving and planning [15] and directly builds
upon the framework introduced by Bolander and Andersen [8] and Lo¨we, Pacuit, and Witzel [22], who
formulated the planning problem in the context of Dynamic Epistemic Logic (DEL) [13]. Andersen,
Bolander, and Jensen [4] extended the approach to allow strong and weak conditional planning in the
single-agent case. Algorithmically, (multi-agent) epistemic planning can be approached either by com-
pilation to classical planning [2, 21, 23] or by search in the space of “nested” [8] or “shallow” knowledge
states [26, 27, 28]. Since compilation approaches to classical planning can only deal with bounded
nesting of knowledge (or belief), similar to Bolander and Andersen [8], we use search in the space of
epistemic states to find a solution. One of the important features that distinguishes our work from more
traditional multi-agent planning [9] is the explicit notion of perspective shifts needed for agents to reason
about the possible plan contributions of other agents—and hence needed to achieve implicit coordination.
Our concepts can be considered related to recent work in temporal epistemic logics [10, 19, 20],
which addresses a question similar to ours, namely what groups of agents can jointly achieve under im-
perfect information. These approaches are based on concurrent epistemic game structures. Our approach
is different in a number of ways, including: 1) As in classical planning, our actions and their effects are
explicitly and compactly represented in an action description language (using the event models of DEL);
2) Instead of joint actions we have sequential action execution, where the order in which the agents act is
not predefined; 3) None of the existing solution concepts considered in temporal epistemic logics capture
the stepwise shifting perspective underlying our notion of implicitly coordinated plans.
The present paper is an extended and revised version of a paper presented at the Workshop on Dis-
tributed and Multi-Agent Planning (DMAP) 2015 (without archival proceedings). The present paper
primarily offers an improved presentation: extended and improved introduction, improved motivation,
better examples, improved formulation of definitions and theorems, simplified notation, and more dis-
cussions of related work. The technical content is essentially as in the original DMAP paper, except
we now compare implicitly coordinated plans to standard sequential plans, we now formally derive the
correct notion of an implicitly coordinated plan from the natural conditions it should satisfy, and we have
added a proposition that gives a semantic characterisation of implicitly coordinated policies.
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2 Theoretical Background
To represent planning tasks as the ‘apartment borrowing’ example of the introduction, we need a formal
framework where: (1) agents can reason about the knowledge and ignorance of other agents; (2) both
fully and partially observable actions can be described in a compact way (Bob doesn’t see Anne placing
the key under the mat). Dynamic Epistemic Logic (DEL) satisfies these conditions. We first briefly
recapitulate the foundations of DEL, following the conventions of Bolander and Andersen [8]. What is
new in this exposition is mainly the parts on perspective shifts in Section 2.2.
We now define epistemic languages, epistemic states and epistemic actions. All of these are defined
relative to a given finite set of agents A and a given finite set of atomic propositions P. To keep the
exposition simple, we will not mention the dependency on A and P in the following.
2.1 Epistemic Language and Epistemic States
Definition 1. The epistemic language LKC is ϕ ::= > | ⊥ | p | ¬ϕ | ϕ ∧ϕ | Kiϕ |Cϕ where p ∈ P and
i ∈ A.
We read Kiϕ as “agent i knows ϕ” and Cϕ as “it is common knowledge that ϕ”.
Definition 2. An epistemic model isM= 〈W,(∼i)i∈A,V 〉 where
• The domain W is a non-empty finite set of worlds.
• ∼i ⊆W ×W is an equivalence relation called the indistinguishability relation for agent i.
• V : P→P(W ) assigns a valuation to each atomic proposition.
For Wd ⊆W , the pair (M,Wd) is called an epistemic state (or simply a state), and the worlds of
Wd are called the designated worlds. A state is called global if Wd = {w} for some world w (called the
actual world), and we then often write (M,w) instead of (M,{w}). We use Sgl to denote the set of
global states. For any state s = (M,Wd), we let Globals(s) = {(M,w) | w ∈Wd}. A state (M,Wd) is
called a local state for agent i if Wd is closed under ∼i. A local state for i is minimal if Wd is a minimal
set closed under∼i. We use Smini to denote the set of minimal local states of i. Given a state s= (M,Wd),
the associated local state of agent i, denoted si, is (M,{v | v∼i w and w ∈Wd}).
Definition 3. Let (M,Wd) be a state withM= 〈W,(∼i)i∈A,V 〉. For i ∈ A, p ∈ P and ϕ,ψ ∈ LKC, we
define truth as follows (with the propositional cases being standard and hence left out):
(M,Wd) |= ϕ iff (M,w) |= ϕ for all w ∈Wd
(M,w) |= Kiϕ iff (M,w′) |= ϕ for all w′ ∼i w
(M,w) |=Cϕ iffM,w′ |= ϕ for all w′ ∼∗ w
where ∼∗ is the transitive closure of ⋃i∈A ∼i.
Example 1. LetA= {Anne,Bob} and P= {m}, where m is intended to express that the key is under the
door mat. Consider the following global state s = (M,w), where the nodes represent worlds, the edges
represent the indistinguishability relations (reflexive edges left out), and is used for designated worlds:
s = (M,w) =
w : m v :
Bob
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Each node is labeled by the name of the world, and the list of atomic propositions true at the world. The
state represents a situation where the key is under the door mat (m is true at the actual world w), but Bob
considers it possible that it isn’t (m is not true at the world v indistinguishable from w by Bob). We can
verify that in this state Anne knows that the key is under the mat, Bob doesn’t, and Anne knows that he
doesn’t: s |= KAnnem∧¬KBobm∧KAnne¬KBobm. The fact that Bob does not know the key to be under the
mat can also be expressed in terms of local states. Bob’s local perspective on the state s is his associated
local state sBob = (M,{w,v}). We have sBob 6|= m, signifying that from Bob’s perspective, m can not be
verified.
2.2 Perspective Shifts
In general, given a global state s, the associated local state si will represent agent i’s internal perspective
on that state. Going from si to (si) j amounts to a perspective shift, where agent i’s perspective on the
perspective of agent j is taken. In Example 1, Anne’s perspective on the state s is sAnne, which is s itself.
Bob’s perspective is sBob = (M,{w,v}). When Anne wants to reason about the available actions to Bob,
e.g. whether he will be able to take the key from under the door mat or not, she will have to shift to his
perspective, i.e. reason about what holds true in (sAnne)Bob, which is the same as sBob in this case. This
type of perspective shift is going to be central in our notion of implicitly coordinated plans, since it is
essential to the ability of an agent to reason about other agents’ possible contributions to a plan from their
own perspective. As the introductory example shows, this ability is essential: If Anne can not reason
about Bob’s contribution to the overall plan from his own perspective, she will not realize that she needs
to call him to let him know where the key is.
Note that any local state s induces a unique set of global states, Globals(s), and that we can hence
choose to think of s as a compact representation of the “belief state” Globals(s) over global states.
We have the following basic properties concerning perspective shifts (associated local states), where
the third follows directly from the two first:
Proposition 1. Let s be a state, i ∈ A and ϕ ∈ LKC.
1. si |= ϕ iff s |= Kiϕ .
2. If s is local for agent i then si = s.
3. If s is local for agent i then s |= ϕ iff s |= Kiϕ .
2.3 Dynamic Language and Epistemic Actions
To model actions, like announcing locations of keys and picking them up, we use the event models of
DEL.
Definition 4. An event model is E = 〈E,(∼i)i∈A,pre,post〉 where
• The domain E is a non-empty finite set of events.
• ∼i ⊆ E×E is an equivalence relation called the indistinguishability relation for agent i.
• pre : E→LKC assigns a precondition to each event.
• post : E →LKC assigns a postcondition to each event. For all e ∈ E, post(e) is a conjunction of
literals (atomic propositions and their negations, including >).
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For Ed ⊆ E, the pair (E ,Ed) is called an epistemic action (or simply an action), and the events in Ed are
called the designated events. An action is called global if Ed = {e} for some event e, and we then often
write (E ,e) instead of (E ,{e}). Similar to states, (E ,Ed) is called a local action for agent i when Ed is
closed under ∼i.
Each event of an epistemic action represents a different possible outcome. By using multiple events
e,e′ ∈ E that are indistinguishable (i.e. e ∼i e′), it is possible to obfuscate the outcomes for some agent
i ∈A, i.e. modeling partially observable actions. Using event models with |Ed |> 1, it is also possible to
model sensing actions (where a priori, multiple outcomes are considered possible), and nondeterministic
actions [8].
The product update is used to specify the successor state resulting from the application of an action
in a state.
Definition 5. Let a state s = (M,Wd) and an action a = (E ,Ed) be given withM= 〈W,(∼i)i∈A,V 〉 and
E = 〈E,(∼i)i∈A,pre,post〉. Then the product update of s with a is s⊗a = (〈W ′,(∼′i)i∈A,V ′〉 ,W ′d) where
• W ′ = {(w,e) ∈W ×E | M,w |= pre(e)}
• ∼′i = {((w,e),(w′,e′)) ∈W ′×W ′ | w∼i w′ and e∼i e′}
• V ′(p) = {(w,e) ∈W ′ | post(e) |= p or (M,w |= p and post(e) 6|= ¬p)}
• W ′d = {(w,e) ∈W ′ | w ∈Wd and e ∈ Ed}.
Example 2. Consider the following epistemic action try-take = (E ,{e, f}), using the same conventions
as for epistemic models, except each event e is labeled by 〈pre(e),post(e)〉:
try-take = (E ,{e, f}) =
e : 〈m,h∧¬m〉 f : 〈¬m,>〉
Anne
It represents the action of Bob attempting to take the key from under the mat. The event e = 〈m,h∧¬m〉
represents that if the key is indeed under the mat (the precondition m is true), then the result will be
that Bob holds the key and it is no longer under the mat (the postcondition h∧¬m becomes true). The
event f = 〈¬m,>〉 represents that if the key is not under the mat, nothing will happen (the postcondition
is the trivial one, >). Note the indistinguishability edge for Anne: She is not there to see whether the
action is successful or not. Note however that she is still is aware that either e or f happens, so the action
represents the situation where she knows that he is attempting to take the key, but not necessarily whether
he is successful (except if she already either knows m or knows ¬m).
Letting s denote the state from Example 1, we can calculate the result of executing try-take in s:
s⊗ try-take =
(w,e) : h (v, f ) :
Note that the result is for Bob to have the key and for this to be common knowledge among Anne and
Bob (s⊗ try-take |=Ch). So it seems that if we assume initially to be in the state s, and want to find a
plan to achieve h, then the simple plan consisting only of the action try-take should work. It is, however,
a bit more complicated than that. Let us assume that Bob does strong planning, that is, only looks for
plans that are guaranteed to reach the goal. The problem is then that, from Bob’s perspective, try-take
can not be guaranteed to reach the goal. This is formally because we have:
sBob⊗ try-take =
(w,e) : h (v, f ) :
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Both worlds being designated, but distinguishable, means that Bob at plan time (before executing the
action) considers them both as possible outcomes of try-take, but is aware that he will at run time (after
having executed the action) know which one it is (see [8] for a more full discussion of the plan time/run
time distinction). Since the world (v, f ) is designated, we have sBob⊗ try-take 6|= h. So from Bob’s
perspective, try-take might fail to produce h and is hence not a strong plan to achieve h. Intuitively, it is
of course simply because he does not, at plan time, know whether the key is under the mat or not.
Since sAnne = s and s⊗ try-take |= h, it might seem that try-take is still a strong plan to achieve h from
the perspective of Anne. But in fact, it is not, at least not of the implicitly coordinated type we will define
below. The issue is, try-take is still an action that Bob has to execute, but Anne knows that Bob does not
know it to be succesful, and she can therefore not expect him to execute it. The idea is that when Anne
comes up with a plan that involves actions of Bob, she should change her perspective to his, in order to
find out what he can be expected to do. Technically speaking, it is because (sAnne)Bob⊗ try-take 6|= h that
the plan is not implicitly coordinated from the perspective of Anne.
We extend the language LKC into the dynamic language LDEL by adding a modality [(E ,e)] for each
global action (E ,e). The truth conditions are extended with the following standard clause from DEL:
(M,w) |= [(E ,e)]ϕ iff (M,w) |= pre(e) implies (M,w)⊗ (E ,e) |= ϕ .
We define the following abbreviations:
[(E ,Ed)]ϕ :=∧e∈Ed [(E ,e)]ϕ and 〈(E ,Ed)〉ϕ := ¬[(E ,Ed)]¬ϕ.
We say that an action (E ,Ed) is applicable in a state (M,Wd) if for all w∈Wd there is an event e∈ Ed s.t.
(M,w) |= pre(e). Intuitively, an action is applicable in a state if for each possible situation (designated
world), at least one possible outcome (designated event) is specified.
Example 3. Consider again the state s from Example 1 and the action try-take from Example 2. The
action try-take is trivially seen to be applicable in the state s, since the designated event e has its
precondition satisfied in the designated world w. The action try-take is also applicable in sBob, since
(M,w) |= pre(e) and (M,v) |= pre( f ). This shows that try-take is applicable from the perspective of
Bob. Intuitively, it is so because it is only an action for attempting to take the key. Even if the key is not
under the mat, the action will specify an outcome (having the trivial postcondition >).
Let s = (M,Wd) denote an epistemic state and a = (E ,Ed) an action. Andersen [3] shows that a
is applicable in s iff s |= 〈a〉>, and that s |= [a]ϕ iff s⊗ a |= ϕ . We now define a further abbreviation:
((a))ϕ := 〈a〉>∧ [a]ϕ . Hence:
s |= ((a))ϕ iff a is applicable in s and s⊗a |= ϕ (1)
Thus ((a))ϕ means that the application of a is possible and will (necessarily) lead to a state fulfilling ϕ .
3 Cooperative Planning
As mentioned in the introduction, in this paper we assume each action to be executable by a single agent,
that is, we are not considering joint actions. In our ‘apartment borrowing’ example there are two agents,
Anne and Bob. They are supposed to execute different parts of the plan to reach the goal of Bob getting
access to the apartment. For instance, Anne is the one to put the key under the mat, and Bob is the one
to take it from under the mat. To represent who performs which actions of a plan, we will introduce
what we call an owner function (inspired by the approach of Lo¨we, Pacuit, and Witzel [22]). An owner
function is defined to be a mapping ω : A→A, mapping each action to the agent who can execute it. For
T. Engesser, T. Bolander, R. Mattmu¨ller & B. Nebel 81
any action a ∈ A, we call ω(a) the owner of a. Note that by defining the owner function this way, every
action has a unique owner. This can be done without loss of generality, since we can always include
any number of semantically equivalent actions in A, if we wish some action to be executable by several
agents (e.g., if we want both Anne and Bob to be able to open and close the door). We can now define
epistemic planning tasks.
Definition 6. A cooperative planning task (or simply a planning task) Π = 〈s0,A,ω,γ〉 consists of an
initial epistemic state s0, a finite set of epistemic actions A, an owner function ω : A→A, and a goal
formula γ of LKC. Each a ∈ A has to be local for ω(a). When s0 is a global state, we call it a global
planning task. When s0 is local for agent i, we call it a planning task for agent i. Given a planning task
Π= 〈s0,A,ω,γ〉 and a state s, we define Π(s) := 〈s,A,ω,γ〉. Given a planning task Π= 〈s0,A,ω,γ〉, the
associated planning task for agent i is Πi =Π(si).
Given a multi-agent system facing a global planning task Π, each individual agent i is facing the
planning task Πi (agent i cannot observe the global initial state s0 directly, only the associated local state
s0i).
In the following, we will investigate various possible solution concepts for cooperative planning
tasks. The solution to a planning task is called a plan. A plan can either be sequential (a sequence of
actions) or conditional (a policy). We will first, in Section 3.1, consider the simplest possible type of
solution, a standard sequential plan. Then, in Section 3.2, we are going to introduce the more complex
notion of a sequential implicitly coordinated plan, and in Section 3.3 this will be generalized to implicitly
coordinated policies.
3.1 Standard Sequential Plans
The standard notion of a sequential plan in automated planning is as follows (see, e.g., [17]). An action
sequence (a1, . . . ,an) is called a (standard sequential) plan if for every i≤ n, ai is applicable in the result
of executing the action sequence (a1, . . . ,ai−1) in the initial state, and when executing the entire sequence
(a1, . . . ,an) in the initial state, a state satisfying the goal formula is reached. Let us transfer this notion
into the DEL-based setting of this paper. In our setting, the result of executing an action a in a state
s is given as s⊗ a. Hence, the above conditions for (a1, . . . ,an) being a plan can be expressed in the
following way in our setting, where s0 denotes the initial state, and γ the goal formula: for every i ≤ n,
ai is applicable in s0⊗a1⊗·· ·⊗ai−1, and s0⊗a1⊗·· ·⊗an |= γ . Note that by equation (1) above, these
conditions are equivalent to simply requiring s0 |= ((a1))((a2)) · · ·((an))γ . Hence we get the following
definition.
Definition 7. Let Π = 〈s0,A,ω,γ〉 be a planning task. A standard sequential plan for Π is a sequence
(a1, . . . ,an) of actions from A satisfying s0 |= ((a1))((a2)) · · ·((an))γ .
This solution concept is equivalent to the one considered in [8]. As the following example shows, it
is not sufficiently strong to capture the notion of an ‘implicitly coordinated plan’ that we are after.
Example 4. Consider again the scenario of Example 2 where the key is initially under the mat, Bob does
not know this, and the goal is for Bob to have the key. The only action available in the scenario is for Bob
to attempt to take the key from under the mat. Using the states and actions defined in Examples 1 and 2,
we can express this scenario as a cooperative planning taskΠ= 〈s0,A,ω,γ〉where s0 = s, A= {try-take},
ω(try-take) = Bob, γ = h. In Example 2, we informally concluded that the plan only consisting of try-
take is a strong plan, since it is guaranteed to reach the goal, but that it is not a strong plan from the
perspective of Bob. Given our formal definitions, we can now make this precise as follows:
1. The sequence (try-take) is a standard sequential plan for Π.
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2. The sequence (try-take) is not a standard sequential plan for ΠBob.
The first item follows from the fact that try-take is applicable in s (Example 3), and that s⊗ try-take |= h
(Example 2). The second item follows from sBob⊗ try-take 6|= h (Example 2).
We also have that (try-take) is a standard sequential plan for ΠAnne, since sAnne = s. This proves that
the notion of a standard sequential plan is insufficient for our purposes. If Anne is faced with the planning
task ΠAnne, she should not be allowed to consider (try-take) as a sufficient solution to the problem. She
should be aware that the action try-take is to be executed by Bob, and from Bob’s perspective, (try-take)
is not a (strong) solution to the planning task (Item 2 above). So we need a way of explicitly integrating
perspective-shifts into our notion of a solution to a planning task, and this is what we will do next.
3.2 Implicitly Coordinated Sequential Plans
It follows from Definition 7 that (a1, . . . ,an) is a standard sequential plan for some planning task Π =
〈s0,A,ω,γ〉 iff a1, . . . ,an ∈ A and the formula ((a1)) · · ·((an))γ is true in s0. More generally, we can think
of a planning notion as being defined via a mapping X that takes a plan pi and a planning task Π as
parameters, and returns a logical formula X(pi,Π) such that, for all states s, s |= X(pi,Π) iff pi is a plan
for Π(s). In the case of standard sequential plans, it follows directly from Definition 7 that X would be
defined like this:
X((a1, . . . ,an),〈s0,A,ω,γ〉) = ((a1)) · · ·((an))γ (2)
for all planning tasks 〈s0,A,ω,γ〉 and all a1, . . . ,an ∈ A.
We now wish to define a similar mapping Y , so that s |= Y (pi,Π) iff pi is an implicitly coordinated
plan forΠ(s). Our strategy is to list the natural conditions that Y should satisfy, and then derive the exact
definition of Y (and hence implicitly coordinated plans) directly from those. First of all, the empty action
sequence, denoted by ε , should be an implicitly coordinated plan iff it satisfies the goal formula, which
is expressed by the following simple condition on Y :
Y (ε,〈s0,A,ω,γ〉) = γ. (3)
For non-empty action sequences, the ‘apartment borrowing’ example studied above gives us the
following insights. If Anne is trying to come up with a plan where one of the steps is to be executed by
Bob, then Anne has to make sure that Bob can himself verify his action to be applicable, and that he can
himself verify that executing the action will lead to a state where the rest of the plan will succeed. More
generally, for an action sequence (a1, . . . ,an) to be considered implicitly coordinated, the owner of the
first action a1 has to know that a1 is applicable and will lead to a situation where (a2, . . . ,an) is again an
implicitly coordinated plan. This leads us directly to the following condition on Y , for all planning tasks
〈s0,A,ω,γ〉 and all a1, . . . ,an ∈ A with n≥ 1:
Y ((a1, . . . ,an),〈s0,A,ω,γ〉) = Kω(a1)((a1))Y ((a2, . . . ,an),〈s0,A,ω,γ〉) (4)
It is now easy to see that any mapping Y satisfying (3) and (4) must necessarily be defined as follows,
for all planning tasks 〈s0,A,ω,γ〉 and all action sequences (a1, . . . ,an) ∈ A:
Y ((a1, . . . ,an),〈s0,A,ω,γ〉) = Kω(a1)((a1))Kω(a2)((a2)) · · ·Kω(an)((an))γ
This leads us directly to the following definition.
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Definition 8. Let Π= 〈s0,A,ω,γ〉 be a cooperative planning task. An implicitly coordinated plan for Π
is a sequence (a1, . . . ,an) of actions from A such that:
s0 |= Kω(a1)((a1))Kω(a2)((a2)) · · ·Kω(an)((an))γ (5)
If (a1, . . . ,an) is an implicitly coordinated plan for Πi, then it is said to be an implicitly coordinated plan
for agent i to the planning task Π.
Note that the formula used to define implicitly coordinated plans above is uniquely determined by
the natural conditions (3) and (4).
The following proposition gives a more structural, and semantic, characterization of implicitly coor-
dinated plans. It becomes clear that such plans can be found by performing a breadth-first search over
the set of successively applicable actions, shifting the perspective for each state transition to the owner
of the respective action.
Proposition 2. For a cooperative planning task Π = 〈s0,A,ω,γ〉, a non-empty sequence (a1, . . . ,an) of
actions from A is an implicitly coordinated plan for Π iff a1 is applicable in s
ω(a1)
0 and (a2, . . . ,an) is an
implicitly coordinated plan for Π(sω(a1)0 ⊗a1).
The proposition can be seen as a semantic counterpart of (4), and is easily proven using (1), Propo-
sition 1 and (5).
Example 5. Consider again the planning taskΠ= 〈s0,A,ω,γ〉 of Example 4 with s0 = s, A= {try-take},
ω(try-take) = Bob, γ = h. In Example 4 we concluded that (try-take) is a standard sequential plan for
Π. From Example 2, we have that sBob⊗ try-take 6|= h, and hence s 6|= Kω(try-take)((try-take))h (using (1)
and Proposition 1). This shows that, as expected, (try-take) is not an implicitly coordinated plan for Π.
In the introduction, we noted that the solution to this problem would be for Anne to make sure to
announce the location of the key to Bob. Let us now treat this formally within the developed framework.
We need to give Anne the possibility of announcing the location of the key, so we define a new planning
task Π′ = 〈s0,A′,ω,γ〉 with A′ = {try-take,announce}. Here announce is the action e : 〈m,>〉 with
ω(announce) = Anne. In DEL, this action is known as a public announcement of m. It can now easily
be formally verified that
s |= KAnne((announce))KBob((try-take))h.
In words: Anne knows that she can announce the location of the key, and that this will lead to a situation
where Bob knows he can attempt to take the key, and he knows that he will be successful in this attempt.
In other words, (announce, try-take) is indeed an implicitly coordinated plan to achieve that Bob has the
key, consistent with our informal analysis in the introduction of the paper.
Example 6. Consider a situation with agents A= {1,2,3} where a letter is to be passed from agent 1 to
one of the other two agents, possibly via the third agent. Mutually exclusive propositions at-1,at-2,at-3∈
P are used to denote the current carrier of the letter, while for-1, for-2, for-3 ∈ P denote the addressee. In
our example, agent 1 has a letter for agent 3, so at-1 and for-3 are initially true.
s0 =
at-1, for-2 at-1, for-3
2,3
In s0, all agents know that agent 1 has the letter (at-1), but agents 2 and 3 do not know who of them is
the addressee (for-2 or for-3). We assume that agent 1 can only exchange letters with agent 2 and agent
2 can only exchange letters with agent 3. We thus define the four possible actions a12,a21,a23,a32, with
ai j being the composite action of agent i publicly passing the letter to agent j and privately informing
him about the correct addressee (the name of the addressee is on the envelope, but only visible to the
receiver). I.e.
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ai j =
〈at-i∧ for-2,¬at-i∧at- j〉 〈at-i∧ for-3,¬at-i∧at- j〉
A\{ j}
Given that the joint goal is to pass a letter to its addressee, the global planning task then isΠ= 〈s0,A,ω,γ〉
with A = {a12,a21,a23,a32}, ω(ai j) = i for all i, j, and γ = ∧i∈{1,2,3} (for-i→ at-i). Consider the action
sequence (a12,a23): Agent 1 passes the letter to agent 2, and agent 2 passes it on to agent 3. It can now
be verified that s01 |= K1((a12))K2((a23))γ and s0i 6|= K1((a12))K2((a23))γ for i = 2,3. Hence (a12,a23) is
an implicitly coordinated plan for agent 1, but not for agents 2 and 3. This is because in the beginning
agents 2 and 3 do not know to whom of them the letter is intended and hence cannot verify that (a12,a23)
will lead to a goal state. However, after agent 1’s execution of a12, agent 2 can distinguish between the
possible addressees at run time, and find his subplan (a23), as contemplated by agent 1.
3.3 Conditional Plans
Sequential plans are often not sufficient to solve a given epistemic planning task. In particular, as soon
as branching on nondeterministic action outcomes or obtained observations becomes necessary, we need
conditional plans to solve such a task. Unlike Andersen, Bolander, and Jensen [4], who represent con-
ditional plans as action trees with branches depending on knowledge formula conditions, we represent
them as policy functions (pii)i∈A, where each pii maps minimal local states of agent i into actions of agent
i. We now define two different types of policies, joint policies and global policies, and later show them
to be equivalent.
Definition 9 (Joint policy). Let Π = 〈s0,A,ω,γ〉 be a cooperative planning task. Then a joint policy
(pii)i∈A consists of partial functions pii : Smini → A satisfying for all states s and actions a: if pii(s) = a
then ω(a) = i and a is applicable in s.
Definition 10 (Global policy). LetΠ= 〈s0,A,ω,γ〉 be a cooperative planning task. Then a global policy
pi is a mapping pi : Sgl→P(A) satisfying the requirements knowledge of preconditions (KOP), per-agent
determinism (DET), and uniformity (UNIF):
(KOP) For all s ∈ Sgl, a ∈ pi(s): a is applicable in sω(a).
(DET) For all s ∈ Sgl,a,a′ ∈ pi(s) with ω(a) = ω(a′): a = a′.
(UNIF) For all s, t ∈ Sgl,a ∈ pi(s) with sω(a) = tω(a): a ∈ pi(t).
Proposition 3. Any joint policy (pii)i∈A induces a global policy pi given by
pi(s) =
{
pii(si) | i ∈ A and pii(si) is defined
}
.
Conversely, any global policy pi induces a joint policy (pii)i∈A given by
pii(si) = a for all (s,A′) ∈ pi, a ∈ A′ with ω(a) = i.
Furthermore, the two mappings (pii)i∈A 7→ pi (mapping joint policies to induced global policies) and
pi 7→ (pii)i∈A (mapping global policies to induced joint policies) are each other’s inverse.
Proof. First we prove that the induced mapping pi as defined above is a global policy. Condition (KOP):
If a ∈ pi(s) then pii(si) = a for some i, and by definition of joint policy this implies a is applicable in si.
Condition (DET): Assume a,a′ ∈ pi(s) with ω(a) = ω(a′). By definition of pi we have pii(si) = a and
pi j(s j) = a′ for some i, j. By definition of joint policy, ω(a) = i and ω(a′) = j. Since ω(a) = ω(a′)
we get i = j and hence pii(si) = pi j(s j). This implies a = a′. Condition (UNIF): Assume a ∈ pi(s) and
sω(a) = tω(a). By definition of pi and joint policy, we get pii(si) = a for i = ω(a). Thus si = t i, and
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since pii(si) = a, we immediately get pii(t i) = a and hence a ∈ pi(t). We now prove that the induced
mappings (pii)i∈A defined above form a joint policy. Constraint (KOP) ensures the applicability property
as required by Definition 9, while the constraints (DET) and (UNIF) ensure the right-uniqueness of each
partial function pii. It is easy to show that the two mappings (pii)i∈A 7→ pi and pi 7→ (pii)i∈A are each
other’s inverse, using their definition.
By Proposition 3, we can identify joint and global policies, and will in the following move back and
forth between the two. Notice that Definitions 9 and 10 allow a policy to distinguish between modally
equivalent states. A more sophisticated definition avoiding this is possible, but is beyond the scope of
this paper. Usually, a policy pi is only considered to be a solution to a planning task if it is closed in
the sense that pi is defined for all non-goal states reachable following pi . Here, we want to distinguish
between two different notions of closedness: one that refers to all states reachable from a centralized
perspective, and one that refers to all states considered reachable when tracking perspective shifts. To
that end, we distinguish between centralized and perspective-sensitive successor functions.
We take a successor function to be any function σ : Sgl×A→P(Sgl). Successor functions are in-
tended to map pairs of states s and actions a into the states σ(s,a) that can result from executing a
in s. Which states can result from executing a in s depend on whether we take the objective, central-
ized view, or whether we take the subjective view of an agent. An agent might subjectively consider
more outcomes possible than are objectively possible. We define the centralized successor function as
σcen(s,a) = Globals(s⊗ a). It specifies the global states that are possible after the application of a in
s. If closedness of a global policy pi based on the centralized successor function is required, then no
execution of pi will ever lead to a non-goal state where pi is undefined. Like for sequential planning, we
are again interested in the decentralized scenario where each agent has to plan and decide when and how
to act by himself under incomplete knowledge. We achieve this by encoding the perspective shifts to the
next agent to act in the perspective-sensitive successor function σps(s,a) = Globals(sω(a)⊗ a). Unlike
σcen(s,a), σps(s,a) considers a state s′ to be a successor of s after application of a if agent ω(a) considers
s′ possible after the application of a, not only if s′ is actually possible from a global perspective. Thus,
σcen(s,a) is always a (possibly strict) subset of σps(s,a), and a policy pips that is closed wrt. σps(s,a)
must be defined for at least the states for which a policy picen that is closed wrt. σcen(s,a) must be de-
fined. This corresponds to the intuition that solution existence for decentralized planning with implicit
coordination is a stronger property than solution existence for centralized planning. For both successor
functions, we can now formalize what a strong solution is that can be executed by the agents. Our notion
satisfies the usual properties of strong plans [11], namely closedness, properness and acyclicity.
Definition 11 (Strong Policy). Let Π = 〈s0,A,ω,γ〉 be a cooperative planning task and σ a successor
function. A global policy pi is called a strong policy for Π with respect to σ if
(i) Finiteness: pi is finite.
(ii) Foundedness: for all s ∈ Globals(s0), (1) s |= γ , or (2) pi(s) 6= /0.
(iii) Closedness: for all (s,A′) ∈ pi , a ∈ A′,s′ ∈ σ(s,a), (1) s′ |= γ , or (2) pi(s′) 6= /0.
Note that we do not explicitly require acyclicity, since this is already implied by a literal interpretation
of the product update semantic that ensures unique new world names after each update. It then follows
from (i) and (iii) that pi is proper. We call strong plans with respect to σcen centralized policies and strong
plans with respect to σps implicitly coordinated policies.
Analogous to Proposition 2, we want to give a semantic characterization of implicitly coordinated
policies. For this, we first define a successor of a state s0 by following a policy pi to be a state s ∈
Globals(s′0⊗a) for arbitrary states s′0 ∈ Globals(s0) and arbitrary actions a ∈ pi(s′0). We can then show
that if pi is an implicitly coordinated policy for a planning task Π, each successor state s of the initial
86 Cooperative Epistemic Multi-Agent Planning for Implicit Coordination
state s0 either will already be a goal state, or there will be some agent i ∈ A who can find an implicitly
coordinated policy for his own associated planning task prescribing an action for himself.
Proposition 4. Let pi be an implicitly coordinated policy for a planning task Π = 〈s0,A,ω,γ〉 and let s
be a non-goal successor state of s0 by following pi . Then there is an agent i ∈ A such that pi(s) contains
at least one of agent i’s actions and pi is an implicitly coordinated policy of Π(si).
Proof. The existence of an action a ∈ pi(s) with some owner i follows directly from the closedness
of implicitly coordinated policies. We need to show that pi is also implicitly coordinated for Π(si).
Finiteness and closedness of pi still hold for Π(si), since pi was already finite and closed for Π, and this
does not change when replacing s0 with si. For foundedness of pi for Π(si), we have to show that pi
is defined and returns a nonempty set of actions for all global states s′ ∈ Globals(si). For s itself, we
already known that a ∈ pi(s). By uniformity, since all such s′ are indistinguishable from s for agent i, pi
must assign the same action a to all states s′ ∈ Globals(si).
Example 7. Consider again the letter passing problem introduced in Example 6. Let s0,2 and s0,3 denote
the global states that are initially considered possible by agent 2.
s0,2 =
at-1, for-2 at-1, for-3
2,3
s0,3 =
at-1, for-2 at-1, for-3
2,3
With s1,3 = s0,3⊗a12, a policy for agent 2 is given by pi1 = {s0,3 7→ a12,s0,2 7→ a12} ,pi2 = {s1,3 7→ a23} .
After the contemplated application of a12 by agent 1 (in both cases), agent 2 can distinguish between
s1,2 = s0,2⊗ a12, where the goal is already reached and nothing has to be done, and s1,3, where agent 2
can apply a23, leading directly to the goal state s1,3⊗a23. Thus, pi is an implicitly coordinated policy for
Π2. While in the sequential case, agent 2 has to wait for the first action a12 of agent 1 to be able to find
its subplan, it can find the policy (pii)i∈A in advance by explicitly planning for a run-time distinction.
In general, strong policies can be found by performing an AND-OR search, where AND branching
corresponds to branching over different epistemic worlds and OR branching corresponds to branching
over different actions. By considering modally equivalent states as duplicates and thereby transforming
the procedure into a graph search, space and time requirements can be reduced, although great care has
to be taken to deal with cycles correctly.
4 Experiments
We implemented a planner that is capable of finding implicitly coordinated plans and policies1, and
conducted two experiments: one small case study of the Russian card problem [12] intended to show how
this problem can be modeled and solved from an individual perspective, and one experiment investigating
the scaling behavior of our approach on private transportation problems in the style of Examples 6 and
7, using instances of increasing size.
4.1 Russian Card Problem
In the Russian card problem, seven cards numbered 0, . . . ,6 are randomly dealt to three agents. Alice
and Bob get three cards each, while Eve gets the single remaining card. Initially, each agent only knows
its own cards. The task is now for Alice and Bob to inform each other about their respective cards
using only public announcements, without revealing the holder of any single card to Eve. The problem
1Our code can be downloaded at https://gkigit.informatik.uni-freiburg.de/tengesser/planner
T. Engesser, T. Bolander, R. Mattmu¨ller & B. Nebel 87
was analyzed and solved from the global perspective by van Ditmarsch et al. [14], and a given protocol
was verified from an individual perspective by A˚gotnes et al. [1]. We want to solve the problem from
the individual perspective of agent Alice and find an implicitly coordinated policy for her. To keep the
problem computationally feasible, we impose some restrictions on the resulting policy, namely that the
first action has to be Alice truthfully announcing five possible alternatives for her own hand, and that the
second one has to be Bob announcing the card Eve is holding. Without loss of generality, we fix one
specific initial hand for Alice, namely 012. From a plan for this initial hand, plans for all other initial
hands can be obtained by renaming. For simplicity, we only generate applicable actions for Alice, i.e.
announcements that include her true hand 012. This results in the planning task having a total of 46376
options for the first action, and 7 for the second action. Still, the initial state s0 consists of 140 worlds,
one for each possible deal of cards. Agents can only distinguish worlds where their own hands differ.
Alice’s designated worlds in her associated local state of s0 are those four worlds in which she holds
hand 012.
Our planner needs approximately two hours and 600MB of memory to come up with a solution
policy. In the solution, Alice first announces her hand to be one of 012, 034, 156, 236, and 245. It can
be seen that each of the five hands other than the true hand 012 contains at least one of Alice’s and one
of Bob’s cards, meaning that Bob will immediately be able to identify the complete deal. Also, Eve
stays unaware of the individual cards of Alice and Bob since she will be able to rule out exactly two of
the hands, with each of Alice and Bob’s cards being present and absent in at least one of the remaining
hands. Afterwards, Alice can wait for Bob to announce that Eve has either card 3, 4, 5 or 6.
4.2 Mail Instances
Our second experiment concerns the letter passing problem from Examples 6 and 7. We generalized
the scenario to allow an arbitrary number of agents with an arbitrary undirected neighborhood graph,
indicating which agents are allowed to directly pass letters to each other. As neighborhood graphs, we
used randomly generated Watts-Strogatz small-world networks [30], exhibiting characteristics that can
also be found in social networks. Watts-Strogatz networks have three parameters: The number N of
nodes (determining the number of agents in our setting), the average number K of neighbors per node
(roughly determining the average branching factor of a search for a plan), and the probability β of an
edge being a “random shortcut” instead of a “local connection” (thereby influencing the shortest path
lengths between agents). We only generate connected networks in order to guarantee plan existence.
We distinguish between the example domains MAILTELL and MAILCHECK. To guarantee plan
existence, in both scenarios the actions are modeled such as to ensure that the letter position remains
common knowledge among the agents in all reachable states. The mechanics of MAILTELL directly
correspond to those given in Example 6. There is only one type of action, publicly passing the letter to
a neighboring agent while privately informing him about the final addressee. This allows for sequential
implicitly coordinated plans. In the resulting plans, letters are simply moved along a shortest path to the
addressee. In contrast, in MAILCHECK, an agent that has the letter can only check if he himself is the
addressee or not using a separate action (without learning the actual addressee if it is not him). To ensure
plan existence in this scenario, we allow an agent to pass on the letter only if it is destined for someone
else. Unlike in MAILTELL, conditional plans are required here. In a solution policy, the worst-case
sequence of successively applied actions contains an action passing the letter to each agent at least once.
As soon as the addressee has been reached, execution is stopped.
Experiments were conducted for both scenarios with different parameters (Table 1). For finding
sequential as well as conditional plans, our implementation uses breadth-first search over a regular graph
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Table 1: Runtime evaluation for randomly generated MAILTELL and MAILCHECK instances
(a) MAILTELL, K = 4, β = 0.1
agents 10 20 30 40 50
direct path 1.4 2.3 3.1 3.7 3.6
time/s 0.02 0.14 0.65 2.38 5.02
(b) MAILCHECK, K = 2, β = 0.1
agents 10 15 20 25 30
full path 10.4 16.1 21.7 27.6 33.2
time/s 0.02 0.18 1.14 8.03 38.76
and over an AND-OR graph, respectively. For each set of parameters, 100 trials were performed. For
MAILTELL, direct path denotes the average shortest path length between sender and addressee, while for
MAILCHECK, full path denotes the average length of a shortest path passing through all agents starting
from the sender.
While the shortest path length between sender and addressee grows very slowly with the number
of agents (due to the shortcut connections in the network), the shortest path passing through all agents
roughly corresponds to the number of agents. Since these measures directly correspond to the minimal
plan lengths, the observed exponential growth of space and time requirements with respect to them (and
to the base K) is unsurprising.
Note also that in both scenarios, the number of agents determines the number of worlds (one for
each possible addressee) in the initial state. Since the preconditions of the available actions are mutually
exclusive, this constitutes an upper bound on the number of worlds per state throughout the search. Thus
we get only a linear overhead in comparison to directly searching the networks for the relevant paths.
5 Conclusion and Future Work
We introduced an interesting new cooperative, decentralized planning concept without the necessity
of explicit coordination or negotiation. Instead, by modeling all possible communication directly as
plannable actions and relying on the ability of the autonomous agents to put themselves into each other’s
shoes (using perspective shifts), some problems can be elegantly solved achieving implicit coordination
between the agents. We briefly demonstrated an implementation of both the sequential and conditional
solution algorithms and its performance on the Russian card problem and two letter passing problems.
Based on the foundation this paper provides, a number of challenging problems needs to be ad-
dressed. First of all, concrete problems (e.g. epistemic versions of established multi-agent planning
tasks) need to be formalized with a particular focus on the question of which kinds of communicative
actions the agents would need to solve these problems in an implicitly coordinated way. As seen in
the MAILTELL benchmark, the dynamic epistemic treatment of a problem does not necessarily lead to
more than linear overhead. It will be interesting to identify classes of tractable problems and see how
agents cope in a simulated environment. Another issue that is relevant in practice concerns the interplay
of the single agents’ individual plans. In our setting, the agents have to plan individually and decide
autonomously when and how to act. Also, when it comes to action application, there is no predefined
notion of agent precedence. This leads to the possibility of incompatible plans, and in consequence
to the necessity for agents having to replan in some cases. While our notion of implicitly coordinated
planning explicitly forbids the execution of actions leading to dead-end situations (i.e. non-goal states
where there is no implicitly coordinated plan for any of the agents), replanning can still lead to livelocks.
Both the conditions leading to livelocks and individually applicable strategies to avoid them need to be
investigated.
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